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This document describes the PERMIS X.509 Based Privilege Management  
Infrastructure, which is a trust management system as described in  
RFC 2704 [2]. The PERMIS Infrastructure is compared with the AAA  
Authorisation Framework described in RFC 2904 [4], and is shown to be  




RFC 2704 describes the KeyNote trust management system, which  
provides a unified approach to specifying and interpreting  
authorisation policies, credentials, and relationships for use by  
Internet services. 
 
RFC 2904 provides an architectural framework for understanding the  
authorisation of Internet resources and services. 
 
Version 4 of X.509 [3] describes a Privilege Management  
Infrastructure that uses attribute certificates to store a user's  
privileges/credentials. X.509 PMIs can provide some of the components  
for trust management systems. 
 
ISO/IEC 10181-3 [5] describes an access control framework for use by  
open systems, and separates the authorisation gatekeeping function  
into two components, the application dependent Access Control  
Enforcement Function (AEF) and the application independent Access  
Control Decision Function (ADF). 
 
The EC PERMIS project has built a trust management system for use by  
Internet applications that is based on an X.509 PMI and the above  
frameworks. The access control decision function (ADF) is written in  
Java, whilst the authorisation policy is written in XML. The policy  
and the attribute certificates are stored in LDAP directories so that  
they can be accessed via the Internet. This allows the administration  
of privileges to be widely distributed over the Internet, and for  
authorisation decisions to be delegated to external organisations. 
 
This InternetDraft/RFC is one of a set of three documents. It  
describes the PERMIS PMI, and shows how it relates to and is  
consistent with the prior work in RFCs 2904 and 2704. The other two  




2. A brief introduction to X.509 PMIs. 
 
In order to control access to a resource, both authentication and  
authorization are needed. Early versions of the ITU-T X.509 standard  
[3] have concentrated on standardizing strong authentication  
techniques, based on digital signatures, public key certificates, and  
Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs). The latest version of X.509, due  
to be published in 2002, is the first edition to standardize an  
authorization technique and this is based on attribute certificates  
and Privilege Management Infrastructures (PMIs). A PMI is to  
authorization what a PKI is to authentication. Consequently there are  
many similar concepts shared between PKIs and PMIs.  
 
A public key certificate (PKC) is used for authentication and  
maintains a strong binding between a user's name and his public key,  
whilst an attribute certificate (AC) is used for authorization and  
maintains a strong binding between a user's name and one or more  
privilege attributes. The entity that digitally signs a public key  
certificate is called a Certification Authority (CA), whilst the  
entity that digitally signs an attribute certificate is called an  
Attribute Authority (AA). The root of trust of a PKI is sometimes  
called the root CA or the trust anchor, whilst the root of trust of a  
PMI is called the Source of Authority (SOA).  CAs may have  
subordinate CAs that they trust, and to which they delegate the  
powers of authentication and certification. Similarly, SOAs may  
delegate their powers of authorization to trusted subordinate AAs. If  
a user needs to have his signing key revoked, a CA will issue a  
certificate revocation list (CRL). Similarly if a user needs to have  
his authorization permissions revoked, an AA will issue an attribute  
certificate revocation list (ACRL). 
 
 
3. Trust Management 
 
RFC 2704 says that a trust-management system has five basic  
components: 
 i) A language for describing `actions', which are operations  
with security consequences that are to be controlled by the  
system. 
ii) A mechanism for identifying `principals', which are entities       
that can be authorized to perform actions. 
iii) A language for specifying application `policies', which  
govern the actions that principals are authorized to  
perform. 
iv) A language for specifying `credentials', which allow  
principals to delegate authorization to other principals. 
v) A `compliance checker', which provides a service to  
applications for determining how an action requested by  
principals should be handled, given a policy and a set of  
credentials. 
 
X.509 attribute certificates specify mechanisms for ii) and iv).  
Principals are the holders of ACs and can be identified by their  
X.500/LDAP distinguished names [6][9] or by reference to their public  
key certificates (issuer name and serial number). Credentials are  
specified as X.500 attributes [6], which comprise an attribute type  
and value. The PERMIS policy (iii) and action (i) language have been  
specified in XML, and the DTD for these is described in [7]. The  
compliance checker (v) is actually the same as the ADF of ISO/IEC  
10181-3. The PERMIS compliance checker is written in Java, and the  
API to this is briefly described in section 7 and more fully in [8]. 
 
 
4. Authorisation Frameworks 
 
RFC 2904 describes the different entities in an authorisation  
infrastructure, these being: 
i) the user who wants to access a resource 
ii) the user's home organisation (UHO) that authorises the user  
to access the resource 
iii) the service provider of the resource, comprising 
iii A) the resource's AAA Server which authorizes the user's  
service request based on an agreement with the UHO, but  
without specific knowledge of the individual user 
iii B) the resource's Service Equipment that provides the service  
itself. This might, for example, be a print server in the  
Internet Printing service. 
 
RFC 2904 further describes the interactions between the entities when 
a) the UHO and service provider are in the same domain, and 
b) the user is roaming, and the UHO and service provider are  
in different domains. 
 
ISO/IEC 10181-3 further breaks down the AAA server into the  
application dependent Access Control Enforcement Function (AEF) and  
application independent Access Control Decision Function (ADF). As  
previously stated, the ADF is the compliance checker of a trust  
management system. 
 
5. The PERMIS Privilege Management Infrastructure 
 
The PERMIS PMI is described primarily using terminology from the AAA  
Authorisation Framework. The UHO is the entity that allocates  
privileges to users, in the form of digitally signed X.509 attribute  
certificates. The UHO is a privilege allocator in PERMIS terminology  
and an SOA in X.509 terminology. Once created, the ACs may either be  
stored in an LDAP directory local to the UHO (the pull model), or  
given to the user for him to use as required (the push model). If the  
UHO supports delegation, then there may be subordinate AAs within the  
UHO, who are also authorised to issue ACs to users. The privileges,  
or authorisations within the ACs, are allocated in the form of X.500  
attributes, comprising an attribute type and value. As PERMIS has  
implemented a role based access control infrastructure, the  
attributes are considered to be roles. For any given attribute type,  
for example, "employment role", the role values may form a role  
hierarchy, for example: director > departmental manager > project  
leader > team leader > employee. Then the privileges given to the  
subordinate roles are automatically inherited by the superior roles.  
The authorisation policy dictates which roles have which access  
privileges. 
 
The concept of a role within PERMIS has been generalised to cover any  
title, certificate, membership or other role that can be given to a  
user. So for example, a university degree is considered to be a role  
(where the UHO is the university, the attribute type is "degree", and  
the attribute value is the degree classification); an ISO 9000  
certificate can be a role (where the UHO is the certification body  
assessing the organisational unit, the user is the organisational  
unit that was assessed, the attribute type is "ISO certified" and the  
attribute value is the number of the ISO standard against which the  
organisational unit was assessed); membership of the Internet Society  
can be a role (where the UHO is the Internet Society, the attribute  
type is "membership number" and the attribute value is the membership  
number). In general, Service Providers will determine which roles are  
required for access to their Service Equipment, and will authorise  
UHOs to allocate them. The act of authorisation takes place by some  
inter-organisational contract, and is technically enabled when  
details of the UHO and its roles are written into the role assignment  
policy (see later) that controls access to the service.  
 
One can immediately see that PERMIS allows multiple UHOs to be  
associated with a single service. This is because users may be given  
different roles by different UHOs. (For example, I have a frequent  
flyer card allocated by my favourite airline, another one from the  
hotel chain I use, and a credit card from Visa. I might need all  
these when making a hotel booking across the Internet. Once all of  
these exist electronically as X.509 ACs, I should no longer need to  
carry the plastic cards around with me.) 
 
When the user tries to access a service, his request is either  
intercepted by the AAA server (as in Figure 1), or relayed to it by  
the service equipment. Either way, it is the AAA Server that makes  
the authorisation decision (and the authentication and accounting  
decisions as well, but these are not discussed further in this  
document).  
 
The AAA Server is decomposed in Figure 1 into its constituent parts  
according to the ISO 10181-3 framework. The AEF is passed the user's  
request, and this is first authenticated by the authentication  
service. If authentication is successful, the user's X.500/LDAP  
distinguished name is passed to the ADF via the PERMIS Java API. The  
PERMIS Java API is briefly described in section 6 below. 
 
The PERMIS model is the same for the single domain case and the  
roaming user case. The only difference is that in the single domain  
case, the ADF will only retrieve ACs from the local LDAP server,  
whereas in the roaming user case, the ADF will retrieve ACs from both  
the local and remote LDAP servers. The list of LDAP servers is passed  
to the ADF at API construction time. 
 
           +------+           +---------+ 
           |      |   ACs     |  UHO /  | 
           | LDAP |<----------|Privilege| 
           |      |           |Allocator| 
           +------+           |         | 
               |              +---------+ 
               | 
               |         AAA Server 
               |  +----------------------+ 
               |  |Authentication Service| 
               |  | -^- - -|- - - - - - -|  
   +------+    |  |  |     |             | 
   |      |    |  |  |     |  AEF        |    +---------+ 
   | User |------>|--/     |             |    | Target/ | 
   |      |    |  |        |             |    | Service | 
   +------+    |  |Decision|   ^         |--->|Equipment| 
               |  | Request|   |Decision |    +---------+ 
               |  |        v   |         | 
               |  |- - - - - - - - - - - | 
               |  |   PERMIS Java API    | 
               |  |- - - - - - - - - - - | 
        Remote |  |                      | 
           ACs \->|        ADF           | 
                  +----------------------+ 
                          ^ 
           +------+       |Policy AC     
           |      |       |Local ACs  
           | LDAP |-------/           +------+ 
           |      |<------------------| UHO  |      
           +------+                   |      |  
                                      +------+ 
 
Figure 1. The PERMIS Infrastructure 
 
 
6. The PERMIS Authorisation Policy 
 
The authorization policy specifies who has what type of access to  
which targets, and under what conditions. Domain wide policy  
authorization is far more preferable than having separate  
discretionary access control (DAC) lists configured into each target.  
The latter is hard to manage, duplicates the effort of the  
administrators (since the task has to be repeated for each target),  
and is less secure since it is very difficult to keep track of which  
access rights any particular user has across the whole domain. Policy  
based authorization on the other hand allows the domain administrator  
(the local SOA/UHO) to specify the authorization policy for the whole  
domain, and all targets will then be controlled by the same set of  
rules.  
 
The PERMIS authorisation policy uses the hierarchical RBAC model for  
specifying authorizations. RBAC has the advantage of scalability over  
DAC, and can easily handle large numbers of users, which is  
especially important for Internet applications, as there are  
typically far fewer roles than users.  
 
The PERMIS project decided to use XML as the policy specification  
language, since there are lots of tools around that support XML, it  
is fast becoming an industry standard, and raw XML can be read and  
understood by many technical people. 
 
The Data Type Definition (DTD) for the PERMIS X.500 PMI RBAC Policy  
comprises the following components: 
- SubjectPolicy – this specifies the subject domains i.e. only users  
from a specified subject domain may be authorized to access  
resources covered by this policy. 
- RoleHierarchyPolicy – this specifies the different roles  
recognised by this policy and their hierarchical relationships to  
each other. 
- SOAPolicy – this specifies which SOAs are trusted to allocate  
roles, and permits the distributed managements of role allocation  
to take place. The first SOA in the list is the one for the local  
domain, and subsequent SOAs are from trusted remote domains. This  
is actually a form of cross certification of remote authorisation  
domains. 
- RoleAssignmentPolicy – this specifies which roles may be allocated  
to which subjects by which SOAs, whether delegation of roles may  
take place or not, and how long the roles may be assigned for. 
- TargetPolicy – this specifies the target domains covered by this  
policy. 
- ActionPolicy – this specifies the actions (or methods) supported  
by the targets, along with the parameters that should be passed  
along with each action e.g. action Open with parameter Filename. 
- TargetAccessPolicy – this specifies which roles have permission to  
perform which actions on which targets, and under which  
conditions. Conditions are specified using Boolean logic and might  
contain constraints such as "IF time is GT 9am AND time is LT 5pm  
OR IF Calling IP address is a subset of 125.67.x.x". All actions  
that are not specified in a Target Access Policy are denied. 
 
A full description of the policy can be found in [7]. 
 
 
7. The PERMIS Java API 
 
The PERMIS Java API comprises 3 simple methods: GetCreds, Decision,  
and Shutdown, and a Constructor. The Constructor builds the PERMIS  
API Java object. For construction, the AEF passes the name of the  
local UHO (the SOA that is the root of trust for authorisation), the  
Object Identifier of the authorisation policy, and a list of LDAP  
URIs from where the ADF can retrieve the policy AC and role ACs. The  
first URI in the list must be that of the local LDAP server. The  
policy AC is always retrieved from the first URI in the list, from  
the entry with the LDAP DN [9] of the SOA. The Constructor is usually  
called immediately the AEF starts up. After construction of the API  
has completed, the ADF will have read in and validated the XML policy  
that will control all future decisions that it makes.  
 
When a user initiates a call to the target, the AEF authenticates the  
user, then passes the LDAP DN of the user to the ADF through a call  
to GetCreds. If the user authenticated by digitally signing the  
opening message, verification of the signature will yield the user's  
LDAP DN from the user's PKC. If the user authenticated by another  
method, then the AEF will need to map the user's authenticated name  
into an LDAP DN. The ADF uses this DN to retrieve all the role ACs of  
the user from the list of LDAP URIs passed at initialisation time  
(the "pull" model). The role ACs are validated against the policy  
e.g. to check that the DN is within a valid subject domain, and to  
check that the ACs are within the validity time of the policy etc.  
Invalid role ACs are discarded, whilst the roles from the valid ACs  
are extracted and kept for the user, and returned to the AEF as a  
subject object. GetCreds also supports the "push" model, whereby the  
AEF can pass a set of ACs to the ADF, instead of the ADF retrieving  
them from the LDAP directories. 
 
Once the user has been successfully authenticated he will attempt to  
perform certain actions on the target. At each attempt, the AEF  
passes the subject object, the target name, and the attempted action  
along with its parameters, to the ADF via a call to Decision.  
Decision checks if the action is allowed for the roles that the user  
has, taking into account all the conditions specified in the  
TargetAccessPolicy. If the action is allowed, Decision returns  
Granted, if it is not allowed it returns Denied. The user may attempt  
an arbitrary number of actions on different targets, and Decision is  
called for each one. In order to stop the user keeping the connection  
open for an infinite amount of time (for example until after his ACs  
have expired), the PERMIS API supports the concept of a session time  
out. On the call to GetCreds the AEF can say how long the session may  
stay open before the credentials should be refreshed. If the session  
times out, then Decision will throw an exception, telling the AEF to  
either close the user's connection or call GetCreds again. 
 
Shutdown can be called by the AEF at any time. Its purpose is to  
terminate the ADF and cause the current policy to be discarded. This  
could happen when the application is gracefully shutdown, or if the  
SOA wants to dynamically impose a new authorisation policy on the  
domain. The AEF can follow the call to Shutdown with a new  
Constructor call, and this will cause the ADF to read in the latest  
authorisation policy and be ready to make access control decisions  
again. 
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